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NON-ASSOCIATIVE KEY ESTABLISHMENT FOR LEFT
DISTRIBUTIVE SYSTEMS
ARKADIUS KALKA AND MINA TEICHER
Abstract. We construct non-associative key establishment protocols for all
left self-distributive (LD), multi-LD-, and other left distributive systems. In-
stantiations of these protocols using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid
groups lead to instances of a natural and apparently new group-theoretic prob-
lem, which we call the (subgroup) conjugacy coset problem.
1. Introduction
In an effort to construct new key establishment protocols (KEPs), which are
hopefully harder to break than previously proposed non-commutative schemes,
the first author introduced in his PhD thesis [Ka07] (see also [Ka12]) the first non-
associative generalization of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP [AAG99], which
revolutionized the field of non-commutative public key cryptography (PKC) more
than ten years ago. For an introduction to non-commutative public key cryptog-
raphy we refer to the book by Myasnikov et al. [MSU11]. For further motiva-
tion and on non-associative PKC we refer to [Ka12]. It turns out (see [Ka12])
that in the context of AAG-like KEPs for magmas, left self-distributive systems
(LD-systems) and their generalizations (like multi-LD-systems) naturally occur.
Though we constructed several examples of KEPs for non-associative LD- and
multi-LD-systems [Ka12], we did not provide a general method to construct a
KEP that works for all LD- and multi-LD-systems. We fill this gap in the present
paper. With this method at hand any LD- or multi-LD-system automatically pro-
vides a KEP - while in [Ka07, Ka12] we had to construct the key establishment
functions for each example by hand. Therefore, we obtain a rich variety of new
non-associatiave KEPs coming from LD-, multi-LD-, and other left distributive
systems.
Instantiations of the proposed KEPs with concrete parameter values are left
for future works [KT13].
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Outline. In section 2 we review LD-, multi-LD-, and other left distributive
systems with many examples. Section 3 describes a KEP for all LD-systems with
a discussion of related base problems. In section 4 we describe and analyze a
KEP which does not only apply for all multi-LD-systems, but also for a big class
of partial multi-LD-systems. Finally, in section 5 we discuss instantiations of
these general protocols using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. An
associated base problem leads to an instance of a natural and apparently new
group-theoretic problem, which we call the (subgroup) conjugacy coset problem.
2. LD-systems and other distributive systems
2.1. Definitions.
Definition 2.1. An LD-system (S, ∗) is a set S equipped with a binary operation
∗ on S which satisfies the left self-distributivity law
x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ (x ∗ z) for all x, y, z ∈ S.
Definition 2.2. (Section X.3. in [De00]) Let I be an index set. A multi-LD-
system (S, (∗i)i∈I) is a set S equipped with a family of binary operations (∗i)i∈I
on S such that
x ∗i (y ∗j z) = (x ∗i y) ∗j (x ∗i z) for all x, y, z ∈ S
is satisfied for every i, j in I. Especially, it holds for i = j, i.e., (S, ∗i) is an
LD-system. If |I| = 2 then we call S a bi-LD-system.
More vaguely, we will also use the terms partial multi-LD-system and simply
left distributive system if the laws of a multi-LD-system are only fulfilled for
special subsets of S or if only some of these (left) distributive laws are satisfied.
We begin with some examples of LD-systems taken from [De06].
1. We begin with a trivial example. (S, ∗) with x ∗ y = f(y) is an LD-system
for any function f : S → S.
2. A set S with a binary operation ∗, that satisfies no other relations than
those resulting from the left self-distributivity law, is a free LD-system. Free
LD-systems are studied extensively in [De00].
3. A classical example of an LD-system is (G, ∗) where G is a group equipped
with the conjugacy operation x ∗ y = x−1yx (or x ∗rev y = xyx−1). Note that
such an LD-system cannot be free, because conjugacy satisfies additionally the
idempotency law x ∗ x = x.
4. Finite groups equipped with the conjugacy operation are not the only finite
LD-systems. Indeed, the socalled Laver tables provide the classical example for
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finite LD-systems. There exists for each n ∈ N an unique LD-system Ln =
({1, 2, . . . , 2n}, ∗) with k ∗ 1 = k + 1. The values for k ∗ l with l 6= 1 can be
computed by induction using the left self-distributive law. The Laver tables for
n = 1, 2, 3 are
L1 1 2
1 2 2
2 1 2
L2 1 2 3 4
1 2 4 2 4
2 3 4 3 4
3 4 4 4 4
4 1 2 3 4
L3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 2 4 6 8 2 4 6 8
2 3 4 7 8 3 4 7 8
3 4 8 4 8 4 8 4 8
4 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8
5 6 8 6 8 6 8 6 8
6 7 8 7 8 7 8 7 8
7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Laver tables are also described in [De00].
Many examples for LD-, bi-LD- and multi-LD-systems are given in Dehornoy’s
monograph [De00].
2.2. f-conjugacy. One may consider several generalizations of the conjugacy
operation as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an ansatz
like x ∗ y = f(x−1)g(y)h(x) for some group endomorphisms f, g, h.
Proposition 2.3. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary
operation x ∗ y = f(x−1) · g(y) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
(1) fh = f, gh = hg = hf, fg = gf = f 2, h2 = h.
Proof. . A straightforward computation yields
α ∗ (β ∗ γ) = f(α−1)gf(β−1)g2(γ)gh(β)h(α), and
(α ∗ β) ∗ (α ∗ γ) = fh(α−1)fg(β−1)f 2(α)gf(α−1)g2(γ)gh(α)hf(α−1) ·
hg(β)h2(α).
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion. 
The simplest solution of the system of equations (1) is f = g and h = id. This
leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.4. (LD- or f -conjugacy) Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G).
An ordered pair (u, v) ∈ G × G is called f -LD-conjugated or LD-conjugated, or
simply f -conjugated, denoted by u −→∗f v, if there exists a c ∈ G such that
v = c ∗f u = f(c
−1u)c.
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Remark 2.5. For any non-trivial endomorphism f , the relation −→∗f defines not
an equivalence relation on G. Even the relation −→∗, defined by u −→∗ v if and
only if there exists an f ∈ Aut(G) s.t. u −→∗f v, is not an equivalence relation.
Indeed, transitivity requires the automorphisms (relation must be symmetric!) to
be an idempotent endomorphism (f 2 = f) which implies f = id.
Compare the notion of f -LD-conjugacy with the well known notion f -twisted
conjugacy defined by u ∼f v (for f ∈ Aut(G)) if and only if there exists a c ∈ G
s.t. v = f(c−1)uc =: c ∗twf u, which yields indeed an equivalence relation. On the
other hand, the operation ∗tw = ∗twf is not LD - rather it satisfies the following
"near" LD-law:
α ∗tw (β ∗tw γ) = (α ∗tw β) ∗tw (αf ∗tw γ),
where αf is short for f(α).
Anyway, it follows directly from the definitions that u −→∗ v if and only if
f(u) ∼f v, i.e., any f -LD conjugacy problem reduces to a twisted conjugacy
problem and vice versa. Here we have to extend the notion of twisted conjugacy
from f ∈ Aut(G) to all f ∈ End(G).
Example 2.6. Recall that the n-strand braid group Bn is generated by σ1, ...,
σn−1 where inside σi the (i + 1)-th strand crosses over the i-th strand. There
exists a natural epimorphism from Bn onto the symmetric group Sn, defined by
σi 7→ (i, i + 1). Let G be the kernel of this epimorphism, namely the n-strand
pure braid group Pn. For some small integer d ≥ 1, consider the epimorphism
ηd : Pn −→ Pn−d given by "pulling out" (or erasing) the last d strands, i.e. the
strands n − d + 1, . . . , n. Consider the shift map ∂ : Bn−1 −→ Bn, defined by
σi 7→ σi+1, and note that ∂
d(Pn−d) ≤ Pn. Now, we define the endomorphism
f : Pn −→ Pn by the composition f = ∂
d ◦ ηd.
2.3. Shifted conjugacy. Patrick Dehornoy introduced the following generaliza-
tion of f -conjugacy, and he points out, that once the definition of shifted conju-
gacy is used, braids inevitably appear [De00, De06].
Proposition 2.7. (Exercise I.3.20. in [De00]) Consider a group G, a homomor-
phism f : G→ G, and a fixed element a ∈ G. Then the binary operation
x ∗ y = x ∗f,a y = f(x)
−1 · a · f(y) · x
yields an LD-structure on G if and only if [a, f 2(x)] = 1 for all x ∈ G, and a
satisfies the relation af(a)a = f(a)af(a).
Hence the subgroup H = 〈{fn(a) | n ∈ N}〉 of G is a homomorphic image of
the braid group
B∞ = 〈{σi}i≥1 | σiσj = σjσi for |i− j| ≥ 2, σiσjσi = σjσiσj for |i− j| = 1〉
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with infinitely many strands, i.e., up to an isomorphism, it is a quotient of B∞.
There exists a straightforward generalization of Proposition 2.7 for multi-LD-
systems:
Proposition 2.8. Let I be an index set. Consider a group G, a family of en-
domorphisms (fi)i∈I of G, and a set of fixed elements {ai ∈ G | i ∈ I}. Then
(G, (∗i)i∈I) with
x ∗i y = fi(x
−1) · ai · fi(y) · x
is a multi-LD-system if and only if fi = fj =: f for all i 6= j, [ai, f
2(x)] = 1 for
all x ∈ G, i ∈ I, and aif(ai)aj = f(aj)aif(ai) for all i, j ∈ I.
Proof. A straightforward computation gives
x ∗i (y ∗j z) = fi(x
−1)ai[fi(fj(y
−1))fi(aj)fi(fj(z))fi(y)]x,
(x ∗i y) ∗j (x ∗i z) = [fj(x
−1)fj(fi(y
−1))fj(a
−1
i )fj(fi(x))]aj [fj(fi(x
−1)) ·
fj(ai)fj(fi(z))fj(x)][fi(x
−1)aifi(y)x].
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion. 
Note that this proof also contains proofs of Proposition 2.7 (setting |I| = 1)
and of the following Corollary 2.9 (setting G = B∞, I = {1, 2}, s = ∂, ∗1 = ∗,
∗2 = ∗¯, a1 = σ1 and a2 = σ
−1
1 ).
Consider the injective shift endomorphism ∂ : B∞ −→ B∞ defined by σi 7→ σi+1
for all i ≥ 1.
Corollary 2.9. (Shifted conjugacy, Example X.3.5. in [De00]) B∞ equipped
with the shifted conjugacy operations ∗, ∗¯ defined by
x ∗ y = ∂x−1 · σ1 · ∂y · x, x ∗¯ y = ∂x
−1 · σ−11 · ∂y · x
is a bi-LD-system. In particular, (B∞, ∗) is an LD-system.
2.4. Generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. In the following we
consider generalizations of the shifted conjugacy operations ∗ in B∞. Therefore
we set s = ∂p for some p ∈ N, and we choose ai ∈ B2p for all i ∈ I such that
(2) ai∂
p(ai)aj = ∂
p(aj)ai∂
p(ai) for all i, j ∈ I.
Since ai ∈ B2p, we have [ai, ∂
2p(x)] = 1 for all x ∈ B∞. Thus the conditions of
Proposition 2.8 are fulfilled, and x ∗i y = x∂
p(y)ai∂
p(x−1) defines a multi-LD-
structure on B∞. For |I| = 1, p = 1 and a = σ1, which implies H = B∞, we get
Dehornoy’s original definition of shifted conjugacy ∗.
It remains to give some natural solutions {ai ∈ B2p | i ∈ I} of the equation set
(1). Note that in case |I| = 1 (notation: a1 = a), of course, every endomorphism
f of B∞ with f(σ1) ∈ B2p provides such solution a = f(σ1).
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Definition 2.10. (Definition I.4.6. in [De00]) Let, for n ≥ 2, δn = σn−1 · · ·σ2σ1.
For p, q ≥ 1, we set
τp,q = δp+1∂(δp+1) · · ·∂
q−1(δp+1).
Since a = τ±1p,p ∈ B2p fulfills a∂
p(a)a = ∂p(a)a∂p(a), it provides a lot of (multi)-
LD-structures on B∞.
Proposition 2.11. (a) The binary operation x ∗a y = ∂
p(x−1)a∂p(y)x with a =
a′τp,pa
′′ for some a′, a′′ ∈ Bp yields an LD-structure on B∞ if and only if [a
′, a′′] =
1.
(b) Let I be an index set. The binary operations x ∗i y = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x with
ai = a
′
iτp,pa
′′
i for some a
′
i, a
′′
i ∈ Bp (i ∈ I) yields a multi-LD-structure on B∞ if
and only if [a′i, a
′
j ] = [a
′
i, a
′′
j ] = 1 for all i, j ∈ I. (Note that a
′′
i and a
′′
j needn’t
commute for i 6= j.)
(c) The binary operations x ∗i y = ∂
p(x−1)ai∂
p(y)x (i = 1, 2) with a1 = a
′
1τp,pa
′′
1,
a2 = a
′
2τ
−1
p,pa
′′
2 for some a
′
1, a
′′
1, a
′
2, a
′′
2 ∈ Bp yields a bi-LD-structure on B∞ if and
only if [a′1, a
′′
1] = [a
′
2, a
′′
2] = [a
′
1, a
′′
2] = [a
′
2, a
′′
1] = [a
′
1, a
′
2] = 1. (Note that a
′′
1 and a
′′
2
needn’t commute.)
We see that there exist infinitely many (multi)-LD-structures on BN. Further
examples are provided by Proposition 2.12, which, of course, admits a lot of
variations and generalizations.
Proposition 2.12. Let be p, p1, p2 ∈ N with p1 + p2 = p. The binary operation
x ∗a y = ∂
p(x−1)a∂p(y)x with
a = a′1∂
p1(a′2)∂
p1(τp2,p)τ
−1
p,p1
a′′1∂
p1(a′′2)
for some a′1, a
′′
1 ∈ Bp1, a
′
2, a
′′
2 ∈ Bp2 yields an LD-structure on B∞ if and only if
[a′1, a
′′
1] = [a
′
2, a
′′
2] = 1.
The proofs of Proposition 2.11 and 2.12 are straightforward computations. The
reader is recommended to draw some pictures.
2.5. Yet another group-based LD-system. Though we are sure that it must
have been well known to experts, we haven’t been able to find the following
natural LD-operation for groups in the literature. For a group G, (G, ◦) is an
LD-system with
x ◦ y = xy−1x.
Note that, contrary to the conjugacy operation ∗, for this "symmetric decom-
position" or conjugacy operation ◦, the corresponding relation −→◦, defined by
x −→◦ y if and only if there exists a c ∈ G such that y = c◦x, is not an equivalence
relation. In particular, −→◦ is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive.
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One may consider several generalizations of this symmetric conjugacy operation
◦, as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an ansatz like
x ◦ y = f(x)g(y−1)h(x) for some group endomorphisms f, g, h.
Proposition 2.13. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary
operation x ◦ y = f(x) · g(y−1) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
(3) f 2 = f, fh = gh = fg, hg = gf = hf, h2 = h.
Proof. A straightforward computation yields
α ◦ (β ◦ γ) = f(α)gh(β−1)g2(γ)gf(β−1)h(α), and
(α ◦ β) ◦ (α ◦ γ) = f 2(α)fg(β−1)fh(α)gh(α−1)g2(γ)gf(α−1) ·
hf(α)hg(β−1)h2(α).
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion. 
Except for f 2 = f = g = h = h2, the simplest solutions of the system of
equations (3) are f 2 = f = g and h = id, or f = id and g = h = h2.
Corollary 2.14. (LD- or f -symmetric conjugacy) Let G be a group, and
f ∈ End(G) an endomorphism that is also a projector (f 2 = f). Then (G, ◦f)
and (G, ◦revf ), defined by x ◦f y = f(xy
−1)x and x ◦revf y = xf(y
−1x), are LD-
systems.
Proposition 2.15. Let G be a group, and f, g ∈ End(G).
(i) Then the binary operations ◦f and ∗f (and ∗
rev
f ), defined by x ◦f y = f(x) ·
g(y−1) · h(x) and x ∗f y = f(x
−1 · y) · h(x) (x ∗revf y = x · f(y · x
−1)), are distribu-
tive over ◦. In particular ∗ (∗rev) is distributive over ◦. In short, the following
equations hold.
x ∗f (y ◦ z) = (x ∗f y) ◦ (x ∗f z), x ◦f (y ◦ z) = (x ◦f y) ◦ (◦fz)∀x, y, z ∈ G.
(ii) The operations ◦f and ∗f (∗
rev
f ) are distributive over ◦g if and only if f =
gf = fg.
3. Key establishment for all LD-systems
3.1. The protocol. Recall that a magma is a set M equipped with a binary
operation, say •, which is possibly non-associative. For our purposes all interest-
ing LD-systems are non-associative. Consider an element y of a magma (M, •)
which is an iterated product of other elements in M . Such an element can be
described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these
other elements y1, . . . , yk ∈M . We use the notation y = T•(y1, . . . , yk). Here the
subscript • tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation
•.
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Consider, for example, the element y = ((b • c) • (a • b)) • b. The corresponding
labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the following figure.
Figure 1. The element y = ((b • c) • (a • b)) • b = T•(b, c, a, b, b)
b c a b b
• •
•
•
It is easy to prove by induction (over the depth of the involved trees) that any
magma homomorphism β : (M, •) → (N, ◦) satisfies
β(T•(y1, . . . , yk)) = T◦(β(y1), . . . , β(yk))
for all y1, . . . , yk ∈M .
Proposition 3.1. Let (L, ∗) be an LD-system. Then, for any element x ∈ L, the
left multiplication map φx : y 7→ x ∗ y defines a magma endomorphism of L.
Proof. φx(y1 ∗ y2) = x ∗ (y1 ∗ y2)
LD
= (x ∗ y1) ∗ (x ∗ y2) = φx(y1) ∗ φx(y2). 
We are going to describe a KEP that applies to any LD-system (L, ∗). There are
two public submagmas SA = 〈s1, · · · , sm〉∗, SB = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉∗ of (L, ∗), assigned
to Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
Protocol 1: Key establishment for any LD-system (L, ∗).
1: Alice generates her secret key (a0, a) ∈ SA×L, and Bob chooses his secret
key b ∈ SB.
2: Alice computes the elements a ∗ t1, . . . , a ∗ tn, p0 = a ∗ a0 ∈ L, and sends
them to Bob. Bob computes b ∗ s1, . . . , b ∗ sm ∈ L, and sends them to
Alice.
3: Alice, knowing a0 = T∗(r1, . . . , rk) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes from
the received message
T∗(b ∗ r1, . . . , b ∗ rk) = b ∗ T∗(r1, . . . , rk) = b ∗ a0.
And Bob, knowing b = T ′∗(u1, . . . , uk′) with uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, computes
from his received message
T ′∗(a ∗ u1, . . . , a ∗ uk′) = a ∗ T
′
∗(u1, . . . , uk′) = a ∗ b.
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4: Alice computes KA = a ∗ (b ∗ a0). Bob gets the shared key by
KB := (a ∗ b) ∗ p0 = (a ∗ b) ∗ (a ∗ a0)
(LD)
= KA.
This protocol is an asymmetric modification of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld
protocols for magmas introduced in [Ka07, Ka12].
Figure 2. Protocol 1: Key establishment for any LD-system
Alice Bob
{a ∗ ti}1≤i≤n, a ∗ a0
{b ∗ sj}1≤j≤ma0 ∈ SA, a b ∈ SB
3.2. Base problems. In order to break Protocol 1 an attacker has to find the
shared key K = KA = KB. A successful attack on Bob’s secret key b requires
the solution of
m-simLDP (m-simultaneous LD-Problem):
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ L
2 with s′i = b ∗ si ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m for
some (unknown) b ∈ L.
Objective: Find b′ ∈ L with b′ ∗ si = s
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , m.
Note that in our context, b comes from a restricted domain, namely SA ⊆ L.
This might affect distributions when one considers possible attacks. Neverthe-
less, we use the notion of (simultaneous) LD-Problem for inputs generated by
potentially arbitrary b ∈ L. Similar remarks affect base problems further in the
text.
Even if an attacker finds Bob’s original key b or a pseudo-key b′ (solution to
the m-simLDP above), then she still faces the following problem.
∗-MSP (∗-submagma Membership Search Problem):
Input: t1, . . . , tn ∈ (L, ∗), b ∈ 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗.
Objective: Find an expression of b as a tree-word in the submagma 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗
(notation b = T∗(u1, . . . , uk) for ui ∈ {tj}j≤n).
Proposition 3.2. Let (L, ∗) be an LD-system. We define the generalized m-
simLDP for SB ⊆ L as an m-simultaneous LD-Problem with the objective to find
a b′ in SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗ such that b
′ ∗ si = s
′
i for all i ≤ m.
An oracle that solves the generalized m-simLDP and ∗-MSP for SB is sufficient
to break key establishment Protocol 1.
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Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Bob’s private key. The gen-
eralized m-simLDP oracle provides a pseudo-key b′ ∈ SB with b
′ ∗ si = s
′
i = b ∗ si
for all i = 1, . . . , m. Observe that this implies for any element eA ∈ SA that
b′ ∗ eA = b ∗ eA. In particular, we have b
′ ∗ a0 = b ∗ a0. We feed this pseudo-key
b′ into a ∗-MSP oracle for SB which returns a treeword T
′
∗(u1, . . . , ul) = b
′ (for
some l ∈ N and ui ∈ {tj}j≤n). Now compute
T ′∗(a ∗ u1, . . . , a ∗ ul) ∗ p0
LD
= (a ∗ T ′∗(u1, . . . , ul)) ∗ p0 = (a ∗ b
′) ∗ (a ∗ a0)
LD
= a ∗ (b′ ∗ a0) = a ∗ (b ∗ a0) = K.

Note that here the situation is asymmetric - an attack on Alice’s secret key
requires the solution of the following problem.
n-modsimLDP (Modified n-Simultaneous LD-Problem):
Input: An element p0 ∈ L and pairs (t1, t
′
1), . . . , (tn, t
′
n) ∈ L
2 with t′i = a ∗ ti
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n for some (unknown) a ∈ L.
Objective: Find elements a′0, a
′ ∈ L such that p0 = a
′ ∗ a′0 and a
′ ∗ ti = t
′
i for
all i = 1, . . . , n.
Also here, even if an attacker finds Alice’s original key (a0, a) or a pseudo-key
(a′0, a
′) ∈ SA×L, then she still faces a ∗-submagma Membership Search Problem.
Proposition 3.3. Let (L, ∗) be an LD-system. We define the generalized n-
modsimLDP for SA ⊆ L as a modified n-simultaneous LD-Problem with the ob-
jective to find a′ ∈ L and a′0 in SA = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉∗ such that a
′ ∗ ti = t
′
i for all
i ≤ n.
An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimLDP and ∗-MSP for SA is suf-
ficient to break key establishment Protocol 1.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice’s private key. The
generalized n-simLDP oracle provides a pseudo-key (a′0, a
′)′ ∈ SA × L such that
a′∗a′0 = p0 and a
′∗ti = a
′
i = a∗ti for all i = 1, . . . , n. Observe that this implies for
any element eB ∈ SB that a
′∗eB = a∗eB. In particular, we have a
′∗b = a∗b. We
feed the first component a′0 ∈ SA of this pseudo-key into a ∗-MSP oracle for SA
which returns a treeword T ′∗(r1, . . . , rl) = a
′
0 (for some l ∈ N and ri ∈ {sj}j≤m).
Now, we compute
a′ ∗ T ′∗(b ∗ r1, . . . , b ∗ rl)
LD
= a′ ∗ (b ∗ T ′∗(r1, . . . , rl)) = a
′ ∗ (b ∗ a′0)
LD
= (a′ ∗ b) ∗ (a′ ∗ a′0) = (a ∗ b) ∗ p0 = K.

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Both appproaches described above require the solution of a ∗-submagma Mem-
bership Search Problem. Note that we assumed that the generalized m-simLDP
(resp. n-modsimLDP) oracle already provides a pseudo-key in the submagma SB
(resp. SA) which we feed to the ∗-MSP oracle. But to check whether an element
lies in some submagma, i.e. the ∗-submagma Membership Decision Problem, is
already undecidable in general.
Fortunately, for the attacker, there are approaches which do not resort to solv-
ing the ∗-MSP.
Recall that we defined the generalized m-simLDP for SB ⊆ L as an m-simulta-
neous LD-Problem with the objective to find a b′ in SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉∗ such that
b′ ∗ si = s
′
i for all i ≤ m.
Proposition 3.4. A generalized simLDP oracle is sufficient to break key estab-
lishment Protocol 1. More precisely, an oracle that solves the generalized m-
simLDP for SB and the n-simLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys - though we
need only a pseudo-key for the second component a′ of Alice’s key. The n-simLDP
oracle provides a′ ∈ L s.t. a′ ∗ tj = t
′
j = a ∗ tj for all j ≤ n. And the generalized
m-simLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key b′ ∈ SB s.t. b
′ ∗ si = s
′
i = b ∗ si for all
i ≤ m. Since b′ ∈ SB, we conclude that a
′ ∗ b′ = a ∗ b′. Also, a0 ∈ SA implies, of
course, b′ ∗ a0 = b ∗ a0. Now, we may compute
(a′ ∗ b′) ∗ p0 = (a ∗ b
′) ∗ (a ∗ a0)
LD
= a ∗ (b′ ∗ a0) = a ∗ (b ∗ a0) = K.

Recall that we defined the generalized n-modsimLDP for SA ⊆ L as an n-
simultaneous LD-Problem with the objective to find a a′0 in SA = 〈s1, . . . , sm〉∗
such that a′ ∗ ti = t
′
i for all i ≤ n.
Proposition 3.5. An oracle that solves the generalized n-modsimLDP for SA
and the m-simLDP is sufficient to break Protocol 1.
Proof. Also here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys. The m-
simLDP oracle provides b′ ∈ L s.t. b′ ∗ sj = s
′
j = b ∗ sj for all j ≤ m. And the
generalized n-modsimLDP oracle returns the pseudo-key (a′0, a
′) ∈ SA × L s.t.
a′ ∗ ti = t
′
i = a ∗ ti for all i ≤ n and a
′ ∗ a′0 = p0. Since a
′
0 ∈ SA, we conclude that
b′ ∗ a′0 = b ∗ a
′
0. Also, b ∈ SB implies, of course, a
′ ∗ b = a ∗ b. Now, we compute
a′ ∗ (b′ ∗ a′0) = a
′ ∗ (b ∗ a′0)
LD
= (a′ ∗ b) ∗ (a′ ∗ a′0) = (a ∗ b) ∗ p0 = K.

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4. Key establishment for left distributive systems
4.1. The protocol. Here we describe a generalization of Protocol 1 that works
for all multi-LD-systems. Actually, it suffices if L is only a partial multi-LD-
system, i.e. some distributive laws hold. More precisely, consider a set L equipped
with a pool of binary operations OA ∪ OB (OA and OB non-empty) s.t. the
operations in OA are distributive over those in OB and vice versa, i.e. the following
holds for all x, y, z ∈ L, ∗α ∈ OA and ∗β ∈ OB.
x ∗α (y ∗β z) = (x ∗α y) ∗β (x ∗α z), and(4)
x ∗β (y ∗α z) = (x ∗β y) ∗α (x ∗β z).(5)
Note that, if OA ∩ OB 6= ∅, then (L,OA ∪ OB) is a multi-LD-system.
Let s1, . . . , sm, t1, . . . , tn ∈ L be some public elements. We denote SA =
〈s1, · · · , sm〉OA and SB = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉OB , two submagmas of (L,OA∪OB). For ex-
ample, an element y of SA can be described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose
k leaves are labelled by these other elements r1, . . . , rk with ri ∈ {si}i≤m. Here
the tree contains further information, namely to each internal vertex we assign
a binary operation ∗i ∈ OA. We use the notation y = TOA(r1, . . . , rk). The sub-
script OA tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation
∗i ∈ OA. Consider, for example, the element y = ((s3 ∗α2 s3) ∗α4 s1) ∗α1 (s2 ∗α2 s1).
The corresponding labelled planar rooted binary tree T is displayed in the fol-
lowing figure.
Figure 3. The element y = ((s3 ∗α2 s3) ∗α4 s1) ∗α1 (s2 ∗α2 s1) ∈ SA
s3 s3 s1 s2 s1
∗α2
∗α4
∗α2
∗α1
Let ∗α ∈ OA and ∗β ∈ OB. By induction over the tree depth, it is easy to show
that, for all elements e, e1, . . . , el ∈ (L,OA ∪ OB) and all planar rooted binary
trees T with l leaves, the following equations hold.
e ∗α TOB(e1, . . . , el) = TOB(e ∗α e1, . . . , e ∗α el),(6)
e ∗β TOA(e1, . . . , el) = TOA(e ∗β e1, . . . , e ∗β el).(7)
KEY ESTABLISHMENT FOR LEFT DISTRIBUTIVE SYSTEMS 13
Now, we are going to describe a KEP that applies to any system (L,OA ∪OB)
as described above. We have two subsets of public elements {s1, · · · , sm} and
{t1, · · · , tn} of L. Also, recall that SA = 〈s1, · · · , sm〉OA and SB = 〈t1, · · · , tn〉OB .
Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
Protocol 2: Key establishment for the partial multi-LD-system
(L,OA ∪OB).
1: Alice generates her secret key (a0, a, ∗α) ∈ SA×L×OA, and Bob chooses
his secret key (b, ∗β) ∈ SB × OB.
2: Alice computes the elements a ∗α t1, . . . , a ∗α tn, p0 = a ∗α a0 ∈ L, and
sends them to Bob. Bob computes b∗β s1, . . . , b∗β sm ∈ L, and sends them
to Alice.
3: Alice, knowing a0 = TOA(r1, . . . , rk) with ri ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, computes
from Bob’s public key
TOA(b ∗β r1, . . . , b ∗β rk) = b ∗β TOA(r1, . . . , rk) = b ∗β a0.
And Bob, knowing b = T ′OB(u1, . . . , uk′) with uj ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}, computes
from Alice’s public key
T ′OB(a ∗α u1, . . . , a ∗α uk′) = a ∗α T
′
OB
(u1, . . . , uk′) = a ∗α b.
4: Alice computes KA = a ∗α (b ∗β a0). Bob gets the shared key by
KB := (a ∗α b) ∗ p0 = (a ∗α b) ∗β (a ∗α a0)
LD
= KA.
Figure 4. KEP for the partial multi-LD-system (L,OA ∪OB).
Alice Bob
{a∗αti}1≤i≤n, a ∗α a0
{b∗βsj}1≤j≤ma0 ∈ SA, a, ∗α ∈ OA b ∈ SB, ∗β ∈ OB
Here the operations ∗α ∈ OA and ∗β ∈ OB are part of Alice’s and Bob’s private
keys. As in Protocol 1, explicit expressions of a0 ∈ SA and b ∈ SB as treewords
T, T ′ are also parts of the private keys - though we did not mention it explicitly
in step 1 of the protocols. But here TOA and T
′
OB
also contain all the information
about the grafting operations (in OA or OB, respectively) at the internal vertices
of T , T ′.
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4.2. Base problems. In order to break Protocol 2 an attacker has to find the
shared keyK = KA = KB. A successful attack on Bob’s secret key (b, ∗β) requires
(first) the solution of the following problem.
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ L
2 with s′i = b ∗β si ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m for
some (unknown) b ∈ L, ∗β ∈ OB.
Objective: Find b′ ∈ L and ∗β′ ∈ OB such that b
′ ∗β′ si = s
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , m.
In order to clarify concepts we introduce the following notation, which also
makes it easier to name our base problems at hand. For e ∈ L, let φe,α(x) := e∗αx.
Then, for ∗α ∈ OA, φe,α is by (4) a magma homomorphism on SB. Analogeously,
for ∗β ∈ OB, φe,β ∈ End(SA) by (5). Now, we may reformulate the base problem
for obtaining a pseudo-key on Bob’s secret.
LDEndP (LD-endomorphism Search Problem for SA):
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ L
2 with s′i = φb,β(si) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m for
some (unknown) magma endomorphism φb,β ∈ End(SA) (with ∗β ∈ OB).
Objective: Find magma endomorphism φb′,β′ ∈ End(SA) (∗β′ ∈ OB) such that
φb′,β′(si) = s
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , m.
Recall that we work in the leftdistributive system (L,OA ∪ OB). We define
the generalized LDEndP for (SA, SB) as an LD-endomorphism Search Problem
for SA with the objective to find a magma endomorphism φb′,β′ ∈ End(SA) with
∗β′ ∈ OB and b
′ in SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉OB .
Even if an attacker finds a pseudo-key endomorphism φb′,β′ ∈ End(SA), then
she still faces the following problem.
OB-MSP (OB-submagma Membership Search Problem for SB):
Input: t1, . . . , tn ∈ L, b ∈ SB = 〈t1, . . . , tn〉OB .
Objective: Find an expression of b as a tree-word (with internal vertices labelled
by operations in OB) in the submagma SB (notation
b = TOB(u1, . . . , uk) for ui ∈ {tj}j≤n).
Proposition 4.1. An oracle that solves the generalized LDEndP for (SA, SB)
and OB-MSP for SB is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 2.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Bob’s private key. The
generalized LDEndP for (SA, SB) oracle provides a pseudo-key endomorphism
φb′,β′ ∈ End(SA) with b
′ ∈ SB, ∗β′ ∈ OB such that φb′,β′(si) = s
′
i = φb,β(si) for all
i = 1, . . . , m. Observe that this implies for any element eA ∈ SA that φb′,β′(eA) =
φb,β(eA). In particular, we have φb′,β′(a0) = φb,β(a0). Since b
′ ∈ SB, we may feed
b′ into a OB-MSP oracle for SB which returns a tree-word T
′
OB
(u1, . . . , ul) = b
′
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(for some l ∈ N and ui ∈ {tj}j≤n). Now, we compute
T ′OB(a ∗α u1, . . . , a ∗α ul) ∗β′ p0
LD
= (a ∗α T
′
OB
(u1, . . . , ul)) ∗β′ p0
= (a ∗α b
′) ∗β′ (a ∗α a0)
LD
= a ∗α (b
′ ∗β′ a0) = a ∗α (b ∗β a0) = K.

On the other hand, an attack on Alice’s secret key requires (first) the solution
of the following problem.
modLDEndP (Modified LD-endomorphism Search Problem for SB):
Input: Element pairs (t1, t
′
1), . . . , (tn, t
′
n) ∈ L
2 with t′i = φa,α(ti) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n for
some (unknown) magma endomorphism φa,α ∈ End(SB) (with ∗α ∈ OA).
Furthermore, an element p0 ∈ φa,α(SA), i.e. p0 = φa,α(a0) for some a0 ∈
SA.
Objective: Find (a′0, φa′,α′) ∈ L × End(SB) (∗α ∈ OA) such that φa′,α′(ti) = t
′
i
for all i = 1, . . . , n and φa′,α′(a
′
0) = p0.
We define the generalized modLDEndP for (SB, SA) as a modified LD-endo-
morphism Search Problem for SB with the objective to find (a
′
0, φa′,α′) ∈ SA ×
End(SB) (∗α ∈ OA) such that φa′,α′(ti) = t
′
i for all i = 1, . . . , n and φa′,α′(a
′
0) = p0.
Even if an attacker finds a pseudo-key (a′0, φa′,α′) ∈ SA × End(SB) for Alice’s
secret, then she still faces a OA-submagma Membership Search Problem for SA.
Proposition 4.2. An oracle that solves the generalized modLDEndP for (SB,
SA) and OA-MSP for SA is sufficient to break key establishment Protocol 1.
Proof. As outlined above, we perform an attack on Alice’s private key. The
generalized modLDEndP oracle provides a pseudo-key (a′0, φa′,α′) ∈ SA×End(SB)
such that φa′,α′(ti) = t
′
i = φa,α(ti) for all i = 1, . . . , n and φa′,α′(a
′
0) = p0. Observe
that this implies for any element eB ∈ SB that φa′,α′(eB) = φa,α(eB). In particular,
we have φa′,α′(b) = φa,α(b). Since a
′
0 ∈ SA, we may feed a
′
0 into a OA-MSP
oracle for SA which returns a tree-word T
′
OA
(r1, . . . , rl) = a
′
0 (for some l ∈ N and
ri ∈ {sj}j≤m). Now, we may compute
a′ ∗α′ T
′
OA
(b ∗β r1, . . . , b ∗β rl)
LD
= a′ ∗α′ (b ∗β T
′
OA
(r1, . . . , rl))
= a′ ∗α′ (b ∗β a
′
0)
LD
= (a′ ∗α′ b) ∗β (a
′ ∗α′ a
′
0) = (a ∗α b) ∗β p0 = K.

Now, we describe approaches to break Protocol 2 which do not resort to solving
a submagma-MSP.
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Proposition 4.3. A generalized LDEndP oracle is sufficient to break key estab-
lishment Protocol 2. More precisely, an oracle that solves the generalized LDEndP
for (SA, SB) and the LDEndP for SB is sufficient to break KEP1.
Proof. Here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys - though we do
not require a pseudo-key for the first component a0 of Alice’s key. The LDEndP
oracle for SB provides φa′,α′ s.t. φa′,α′(tj) = t
′
j = φa,α(tj) for all j ≤ n. And the
generalized LDEndP oracle for (SA, SB) returns the pseudo-key endomorphism
φb′,β′ with b
′ ∈ SB s.t. φb′,β′(si) = s
′
i = φb,β(si) for all i ≤ m. Since b
′ ∈ SB, we
conclude that φa′,α′(b
′) = φa,α(b
′). Also, a0 ∈ SA implies, of course, φb′,β′(a0) =
φb,β(a0). Now, we compute
(a′ ∗α′ b
′) ∗β′ p0 = (a ∗α b
′) ∗β′ (a ∗α a0)
LD
= a ∗α (b
′ ∗β′ a0) = a ∗α (b ∗β a0) = K.

Alternatively, one may choose the following approach.
Proposition 4.4. An oracle that solves the generalized modLDEndP for (SB,
SA) and the LDEndP for SA is sufficient to break KEP1.
Proof. Also here we perform attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s private keys. The
LDEndP oracle for SA provides φb′,β′ ∈ End(SA) s.t. φb′,β′(sj) = s
′
j = φb′,β′(sj)
for all j ≤ m. And the generalized modLDEndP oracle for (SB, SA) returns the
pseudo-key (a′0, φa′,α′) ∈ SA ×End(SB) s.t. φa′,α′(ti) = t
′
i = φa′,α′(ti) for all i ≤ n
and φa′,α′(a
′
0) = p0. Since a
′
0 ∈ SA, we conclude that φb′,β′(a
′
0) = φb,β(a
′
0). Also,
b ∈ SB implies, of course, φa′,α′(b) = φa,α(b). Now, we compute
a′ ∗α′ (b
′ ∗β′ a
′
0) = a
′ ∗α′ (b ∗β a
′
0)
LD
= (a′ ∗α′ b) ∗β (a
′ ∗α′ a
′
0) = (a ∗α b) ∗β p0 = K.

Remark 4.5. Note that in the non-associative setting the case m = n = 1 is of
particular interest, i.e. we may abandon simultaneity in our base problems since
the submagmas generated by one element are still complicated objects.
5. Instantiations using shifted conjugacy
5.1. Protocol 1. Consider the infinite braid group (B∞, ∗) with shifted conju-
gacy as LD-operation. Then the LD-Problem is a simultaneous shifted conjugacy
problem. For m = n = 1 this becomes the shifted conjugacy problem (see e.g.
[De06]) which was first solved in [KLT09] by a double reduction, first to the sub-
group conjugacy problem for Bn−1 in Bn, then to an instance of the simultaneous
conjugacy problem. For the simultaneous conjugacy problem in braid groups we
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refer to [LL02, KT13]. If we replace shifted conjugacy by generalized shifted con-
jugacy, then the corresponding LD-problem still reduces to a subgroup conjugacy
problem for a standard parabolic subgroup of a braid group. Such problems were
first solved in a more general framework, namely for Garside subgroups of Gar-
side groups, in [KLT10]. Though not explicitly stated in [KLT09, KLT10], the
simultaneous shifted conjugacy problem and its analogue for generalized shifted
conjugacy may be treated by similar methods as in [KLT09, KLT10]. Though
these solutions provide only deterministic algorithms with exponential worst case
complexity, they may still affect the security of Protocol 1 if we use such LD-
systems in braid groups as platform LD-systems. Moreover, efficient heuristic
approaches to the shifted conjugacy problem were developed in [LU08, LU09].
Therefore, we doubt whether an instantiation of Protocol 1 using shifted conju-
gacy in braid groups provides a secure KEP.
5.2. Protocol 2. Here we propose a natural instantiation of Protocol 2 using
generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups. Consider the following natural
partial multi-LD-system (B∞, OA ∪ OB) in braid groups.
Let 1 < q1 < q2 < p such that q1, p − q2 ≥ 3. Let any ∗α ∈ OA be of the
form x ∗α y = ∂
p(x−1)α∂p(y)x with α = α1τp,pα2 for some α1 ∈ Bq1, α2 ∈ Bq2.
Analogously, any ∗β ∈ OB is of the form x∗βy = ∂
p(x−1)β∂p(y)xwith β = β1τp,pβ2
for some β1∂
q2 ∈ (Bp−q2), β2 ∈ ∂
q1(Bp−q1). Since [α1, β1] = [α1, β2] = [β1, α2] = 1,
the equations (4) and (5) are satisfied. Note that, if in addition we have [α1, α2] =
[β1, β2] = 1, then (B∞, ∗α, ∗β) is a bi-LD-system according to Proposition 2.11
(c). But in general these additional commutativity relations do not hold for our
choice of standard parabolic subgroups as domains for α1, α2, β1, β2. Note that,
if we restrict α2, β2 to ∂
q1(Bq2−q1), then these additional relations are enforced.
Anyway, they are not necessary for (4), (5) to hold. In either case, α2 does not
need to commute with β2.
Then Alice and Bob perform the protocol steps of Protocol 2 for the partial
multi-LD-system (B∞, OA ∪OB) as described in section 4.1.
The deterministic algorithms from [KLT09, KLT10] do not affect the security
of this instantiation of Protocol 2, because the operations are part of the secret.
More precisely, the LD-endomorphism Search Problem for SA specifies to the
following particular simultaneous decomposition problem.
Input: Element pairs (s1, s
′
1), . . . , (sm, s
′
m) ∈ B
2
∞ with
s′i = ∂
p(b−1)β1τp,pβ2∂
p(si)b
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, for some (unknown) b ∈ B∞, β1 ∈ ∂
q2(Bp−q2),
β2 ∈ ∂
q1(Bp−q1).
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Objective: Find b′ ∈ B∞, β
′
1 ∈ ∂
q2(Bp−q2), β
′
2 ∈ ∂
q1(Bp−q1) such that
s′i = ∂
p((b′)−1)β ′1τp,pβ
′
2∂
p(si)b
′
for all i = 1, . . . , m.
If we abandon simultaneity, i.e. in the case m = 1, we obtain a special decom-
position problem. In the following section we transform this particular problem
to an instance of an apparently new group-theoretic search problem.
5.3. Conjugacy coset problem.
Definition 5.1. Let H,K be subgroups of a group G. We call the following
problem the subgroup conjugacy coset problem (SCCP) for (H,K) in G.
Input: An element pair (x, y) ∈ G2 such that xG ∩Hy 6= ∅.
Objective: Find elements h ∈ H and c ∈ K such that cxc−1 = hy.
If K = G then we call this problem the conjugacy coset problem (CCP) for H in
G.
This is the search (or witness) version of this problem. The corresponding
decision problem is to decide whether the conjugacy class of x and the left H-
coset of y intersect, i.e. whether xG ∩ Hy
?
= ∅. Anyway, in our cryptographic
context we usually deal with search problems.
It is clear from the definition that the SCCP is harder than the double coset
problem (DCP) and the subgroup conjugacy problem (subCP), i.e., an oracle
that solves SCCP for any pair (H,K) ≤ G2 also solves DCP and subCP.
Though the CCP and the SCCP are natural group-theoretic problems, they
seem to have attracted little attention in combinatorial group theory so far. At
least we weren’t able to find them in the literature.
We connect the special decomposition problem from the previous section to
the SCCP.
Proposition 5.2. The special decomposition problem (for m = 1) from section
5.2 is equivalent to an instance of SCCP for some standard parabolic subgroups
in braid groups, namely the SCCP for (∂q1(Bp−q1) · ∂
N−p+q2(Bp−q2), BN−p) in BN
for some N ∈ N.
Proof. For m = 1, we write s = sm and s
′ = s′m. Let N ∈ N be sufficiently large
such that s′, ∂p(s) ∈ BN . For convenience, we choose a minimal N such that
N ≥ 2p. As in [KLT09] we conclude that b ∈ BN−p and ∂
p(b−1) ∈ ∂p(BN−p).
Therefore we have
τ−1p,N−p∂
p(b−1) = b−1τ−1p,N−p.
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Furthermore, since τp,pβ2 = ∂
p(β2)τp,p and τ
−1
p,N−pτp,p = ∂
p(τ−1p,N−2p) for N ≥ 2p
1,
we get
s′ = ∂p(b−1)β1τp,pβ2∂
p(s)b ⇔
τ−1p,N−ps
′ = b−1τ−1p,N−pβ1∂
p(β2)τp,p∂
p(s)b
= b−1∂N−p(β1)β2τ
−1
p,N−pτp,p∂
p(s)b ⇔
bs˜′b−1 = β˜ · s˜
with s˜′ = τ−1p,N−ps
′, s˜ = ∂p(τ−1p,N−2ps), and
β˜ = ∂N−p(β1)β2 ∈ ∂
q1(Bp−q1) · ∂
N−p+q2(Bp−q2).

Recall that the algorithms from [KLT09, KLT10], as well as from [GKLT13],
only solve instances of the subgroup conjugacy problem for parabolic subgroups of
braid groups, partially by transformation to the simultaneous conjugacy problem
in braid groups [KTV13]. No deterministic or even heuristic solution to the SCCP
for (standard) parabolic subgroups in braid groups is known yet.
Open problem. Find a solution to the SCCP, or even the CCP, for (standard)
parabolic subgroups in the braid group BN .
The CCP (and the SCCP) appear to be inherently quadratic, i.e. we do not see
how it may be linearized such that linear algebra attacks as the linear centralizer
attack of B. Tsaban [Ts12] apply. It shares this feature with Y. Kurt’s Triple
Decomposition Problem (see section 4.2.5. in [MSU11]).
Remark 5.3. The reader might be slightly disappointed that we did not offer a
proposal with concerete parameter values to get excited about. The reasons are
twofold. First, the purpose of this article is to provide a general scheme how
to get from any LD-, multi-LD-, or even other left distributive system a key
establishment protocol. In this sense we provide a variety of KEP instantiations.
Second, and this is the main reason, our proposal is not the end of the story.
Indeed, in an upcoming paper [KT13] we suggest further improved KEPs for all
LD- and multi-LD-systems etc., namely, systems based on iterated versions of
the LD-problem. There we will provide more concrete proposals, even efficient
instantiations in finite groups which we do not consider as secure platforms for
Protocols 1 and 2. Nevertheless, the reader might feel free to attack, for example,
the instantiation of Protocol 2 using generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups
for some small parameter values which still resist brute force attack.
1If N < 2p then τ−1p,N−pτp,p = ∂
p(τp,2p−N ). But for generic instances N is expected to be
much larger than 2p.
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Further ideas and open problems for instantiating Protocol 1 and 2 are con-
tained in [Ka12].
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